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Abstract—Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a promising cryp-
tographic technique for enabling secure collaborative machine
learning in the cloud. However, support for homomorphic com-
putation on ciphertexts under multiple keys is inefficient. Current
solutions often require key setup before any computation or incur
large ciphertext size (at best, grow linearly to the number of
involved keys). In this paper, we proposed a new approach that
leverages threshold and multi-key HE to support computations
on ciphertexts under different keys. Our new approach removes
the need of key setup between each client and the set of model
owners. At the same time, this approach reduces the number
of encrypted models to be offloaded to the cloud evaluator, and
the ciphertext size with a dimension reduction from (N + 1)× 2
to 2 × 2. We present the details of each step and discuss the
complexity and security of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure computation outsourcing allows the delegation of
expensive computations to a resourceful cloud while preserv-
ing the privacy of user data [1], [2]. Homomorphic encryption
(HE) is a promising cryptographic technique that protects data
in-transmission, at-rest, and in-use without decryption. These
capabilities are important for enabling secure computation on
private data in the cloud.
Typically in well-known HE schemes, such as BGV [3],
B/FV [4], [5], GSW [6], homomorphic computation are per-
formed on data that is encrypted under a single key pair. This
leads to a weaker security model because all participants have
to share the same key pair; that is, they can see each other’s pri-
vate data. Many cloud computing applications require stronger
security, such that private data from different individuals is
encrypted under different key pairs. This security model allows
a group of users to contribute their encrypted data to a
cloud evaluator for joint computations without giving away
their privacy. We refer to such setting as secure collaborative
computing.
Collaborative machine learning [7] is an increasingly im-
portant application of secure collaborative computing because
of the growing interesting in Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS) in the cloud. A set of parties cooperate in training
predictive models on their private datasets and perform secure
classification for the given client inputs, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
For instance, in the application of medical diagnosis multiple
hospitals and medical laboratories contribute their health data
to train predictive models. In another example, credit agencies
such as Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, can jointly assess
a customer’s credit score but none of them are willing to give
up their models. Joint datasets and models are more diverse
and often contain features that help to achieve better accuracy.
Operating on encrypted data helps to prevent incidents such
as the Equifax data leak [8].
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Fig. 1: Secure collaborative machine learning.
A. Computing with multiple keys
Computing on ciphertexts that are encrypted under different
key pairs can be tricky and inefficient. Threshold HE [9] can
produce a joint key using system participants’ keys based on
the additive homomorphic property of secret keys. Before any
computation, all participants cooperate to produce a joint key
in a setup phase. Data will be encrypted using this joint key. At
the end of the evaluation, the users must cooperate to decrypt
the result using a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol.
The security of this approach is based on the learning-with-
error assumption [10] that hides the keys and a dishonest-
majority secret-sharing model [11]. In other words, no one
individual can retrieve the result unless all are cooperating.
The dishonest-majority model may not be efficient in the
collaborative setting. Suppose we have N model owners and
P clients, as illustrated in Fig. 1, for every client we need to
generate a joint key for this client and the group of N model
owners; that is, we will need to produce and maintain P joint
keys. This also means that each model owner has to provide
P copies of the encrypted model to the cloud.
As another solution, multi-key HE [12] supports homomor-
phic computation on ciphertexts encrypted under different keys
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TABLE I: A comparison of different approaches.
Approach # of encryptedmodel copies Ciphertext size (dimension)
Threshold HE [9] P 1× 2
Multi-Key HE [13] 1 (N+1)× 2
This work 1 2× 2
without a joint key setup. Ciphertexts can be extended “on-the-
fly” to a concatenation of participants’ keys. The size, more
specifically dimension, of an extended ciphertext increases
with respect to the number of involved keys. The most efficient
construction of MKHE [13] is based on the BGV scheme [3],
where the ciphertext size increases linearly. For our collab-
orative machine learning scenario, an MKHE solution will
require each ciphertext to be extended to N + 1 different keys
(i.e., the model owners keys plus the key of the requesting
client) before any computation. The efficiency of the system
is affected especially if the number of model owners is large
because it proportionally increases the ciphertext size.
B. Our approach
In this paper, we propose a new approach that supports
homomorphic computation over ciphertexts encrypted under
multi-key and produces small ciphertexts. More specifically,
because the group of N model owners are likely to remain
the same during the evaluation, we propose to generate a joint
key using the threshold HE approach. Client’s request can be
dynamic; hence we adopt the idea of “on-the-fly” ciphertext
extension to transform a ciphertext under the joint key to one
under a concatenation of the model owner’s joint key and the
client’s key. The same treatment is applied to the ciphertexts
under the client’s key. By purposefully combining the two
approaches, we remove the requirement of generating a joint
key for every client and the group of model owners. Also,
we reduce the number of encrypted models from P to 1 and
the dimension of the extended ciphertexts from (N + 1) × 2
to 2 × 2. Note, these approaches are based on the BGV HE
scheme; hence, the base ciphertext dimension is 1×2. Table I
provides a summary of our comparison. In this analysis, we
focus on the ciphertexts of the models because they are stored
in the cloud and used in every evaluation. Also, we make
another contribution in proposing a new decryption protocol
based on the MPC protocol.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview
of the cryptographic techniques used in this paper is presented
in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we present the details and analysis of our
approach. We discuss the related work in Sec. V and conclude
the paper in Sec. VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations and definitions
Given a vector a = (a1, . . . , an), we define a[i] = ai as the
i-th element. Let m× n be the matrix dimensions and B[i, j]
be the j-th element of the i-th row. The dot product of the
two vectors a, b is denoted as 〈a, b〉 =∑ni=1 a[i] · b[i], and the
tensor product is denoted as a⊗ b.
For a security parameter λ, let Φ(x) = xη + 1 be a
cyclotomic polynomial where η as a power of 2. Define the
ring R over the integers R = Z, or over polynomials with
integer coefficients R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)), which can be bounded
by q ∈ Z. Let χ be a Gaussian error distribution over Rq = Zq
and bounded by B  q. The security of the HE schemes is
based on the LWE assumption or its ring variant.
Definition II.1 (LWE [10]). Let a and s be uniformly sampled
elements from Rq = Zq , and let e←χ be a sampled error
term. The learning with errors (LWE) problem [10] is to
distinguish the pair of (ai, bi = as + e) from any uniformly
sampled pair (ai, b′i)←R2q . The LWE assumption is that LWE
problem is computationally infeasible. In another word, secret
key s is hidden by the element a ∈ Rq with small noise.
Definition II.2 (Ring-LWE [14]). Let q and t be two co-prime
moduli where q  t, we define the ciphertext space Rq =
Zq[x]/(Φ(x)) and the plaintext space Rt = Zt[x]/(Φ(x)).
The RLWE assumption is simply the general LWE assumption
but instantiated over the ring of polynomials Rq .
B. Key switching
This technique is applied after homomorphic operations to
transform a ciphertext from one under the key s to one under a
different key s′. It is also called the relinearization step [3] that
reduces the dimension after each homomorphic multiplication
and yield a normal ciphertext that is decryptable by the secret
key s′. This transformation is accomplished with the aid of
auxiliary information provided as evaluation key ek which
encrypts s under s′. To perform key switching, two essential
functions are needed:
- EvalKeyGen(s, s′): Given two keys s ∈ Rkq , s′ ∈ R2q ,
let β = blog qc and compute the powers-of-2 of the old
secret key s˜ = Powersof2(s) = (20s, 2s, . . . , 2βs) ∈ Rkβq .
Sample kβ RLWE instances (ai, ais′ + te′i) and output
ek = {(ai, ais′ + te′i + s˜[i]) ∈ R2q}i=1,...,kβ
- KeySwitch(ek, c) Given a ciphertext c ∈ Rkq under s and
the evaluation key ek, decompose the ciphertext to its
binary such that c˜ = BitDecom(c) = (u0, . . . , ublog qc)
where c =
∑blog qc
i=0 (ui2
i) and output the new ciphertext
as c′ =
∑k
i=0(c˜[i]ek[i]) ∈ R2q which is encrypted under the
new key s′.
C. Threshold HE
Asharov et al. [9] proposed a threshold scheme extended
from the BGV scheme [3]. Formally, given a set of n public
keys pki = (A,Asi + tei) where i ∈ {1, n}, the element
A ∈ Rq is shared, si is the underlaying private key. We
generate a joint public key pk∗ = (A,A
∑
si + t
∑
ei).
Note that only the second component of the individual public
keys is aggregated such that underlying partial secret keys
si are homomorphically added together under the RLWE
assumption. If we add both components of the public keys,
the joint key will be pk∗ = (nA,As∗ + te∗). Subsequently, a
2
ciphertext encrypted under the joint key will be c = (c0, c1) =
(γnA, γAs∗+te∗+µ). Decryption will fail because (γnAs∗ 6=
γAs∗). Two-round setup protocol is required to generate the
joint evaluation key ek∗, which is required for performing
key switching after each homomorphic multiplication since
its generation is trickier due to its fundamentally complex
structure. To decrypt, each user contributes their partial key
si by computing c0si + tei. Then, all users collaboratively
produce a component that contains the sum of all secret keys
shares, that is (c0s∗+ te∗) = (c0
∑
si + t
∑
ei). Refer to the
decryption process Dec(c, sk) = c1 − c0s∗, the message can
be decrypted correctly when we compute c1 − (c0s∗ + te∗).
D. The ring-GSW scheme
Chen et al. [13] proposed a ring variant of the GSW
scheme [6] based on the RLWE problem. The ring-GSW
(RGSW) operates in a ring of polynomials, and its plaintext is
a ring element instead of a single bit. This scheme is used
to generate the evaluation keys that are needed after each
homomorphic operation in the multi-key BGV scheme as will
be discussed in the next subsection. Here, we describe below
the main functions of the RGSW scheme.
- RGSW.Setup(λ): Given a security parameter λ, choose a
modulus t for plaintext space and a modulus q for ciphertext
space. Let β = blog qc+1 be the bit length of the ciphertext
modulus q. Define a B-bounded error distribution χ. Choose
a cyclotomic polynomial Φ(x) = xη + 1 that defines the
polynomial ring R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)). Let Rq = R/qR be a
ring of polynomials of degree η with integer coefficient in
Zq . Output the public parameter pp = (t, q, β, χ,B, Rq).
- RGSW.KeyGen(pp): Sample a small secret element s′←χ
and an error vector e←χ2β . Choose a random vector
a←R2βq Set b = s′a+te ∈ R2βq . Output the secret key sk as
s = (1,−s′) ∈ R2q and the public key pk as (a, b) ∈ R2β×2q .
Note that we need β RLWE instances (a, b) to encrypt β-
bits of the secret key needed for evaluation key generation
- RGSW.Enc(pk, µ): Let µ←Rq be a message and pk =
(a, b) be a given public key. Let G be a gadget matrix
which is a diagonal matrix containing powers-of-2 g =
(1, 2, 4, . . . , 2β−1) such that G = (I2, 2I2, . . . , 2β−1I2)T ∈
R2β×2q , where I2 is a 2× 2 identity matrix. To encrypt the
message µ, choose a random element γ←χ and two error
terms (e0, e1)←χ2β×2 and compute the ciphertext as:
C = γ(a, b) + t(e0, e1) + µG ∈ R2β×2q
Note that the propriety sc = t(e0, e1) + µsG holds.
- RGSW.EncRand(pk, γ): Let γ be the randomness used to
encrypt a message µ, and pk = (a, b) be a given public
key. To encrypt the randomness, compute the powere-of-
2 such that Powersof2(γ) = (γ, 2γ, . . . , 2β−1γ). Choose
β new random elements γ′←χ and two new error terms
(e′0, e
′
1)←χβ . Compute the ciphertext as F = (f0, f1) ∈
Rβ×2q , such that f0[i] = (b[i]γ
′
i+te
′
0[i]+Powersof2(γ)[i]) ∈
Rq and f1[i] = (a[i]γ′i + te
′
1[i]) ∈ Rq . This encryption of
randomness will be used to generate auxiliary information
to help decrypting the extended ciphertexts.
- RGSW.Ext(Ci, Fi, {pkj ; j = 1, . . . , N}): Given a set of N
public keys (pk1, . . . , pkN ) and a ciphertext Ci encrypting
a message µ under pki, extend the ciphertext to multi-keys
as follows
C¯ =

Ci . . . X1 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 . . . Ci . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . XN . . . Ci

Where the component Xj ∈ R2β×2q is constructed using the
public key pkj and the encrypted randomness Fj such that
the k-th row is:
Xj [k, :] = BitDecom(bj [k])Fi ∈ R2q
The scheme supports multi-hop extension, which means that
an extended ciphertext can be further extended to additional
keys. With each extension, the gadget matrix G is also
extended to create a 2Nβ × 2K matrix where the diagonal
element is G. Note that the size of the extended ciphertext
C¯ grows quadratically with the number of involved keys.
E. The multi-key BGV Scheme
Chen et al. [13] introduced the first multi-key BGV (MK-
BGV) scheme that is based on the RLWE assumption. The
new scheme extends the BGV scheme [3] to a multi-hop
MKHE setting (i.e., the extended ciphertext can be extended to
further keys after the homomorphic evaluation). The scheme
supports extending a ciphertext to a fixed number of keys.
Similar to other RLWE-based schemes, the new multi-key
BGV (MKBGV) scheme requires a generation of evaluation
keys to perform key switching technique after each homo-
morphic operation. In the proposed scheme, the evaluation
keys are generated as ring-GSW ciphertexts such that they
can be extended to multiple keys which correspond to the
extended ciphertext. We describe below the main functions of
the proposed MKBGV scheme.
- MKBGV.Setup(λ, L): Given the security parameter λ, a
multiplicative depth L, a bound K on the number of keys,
define the ring of polynomials R = Z[x]/(Φ(x)) and the
error distribution χ as described earlier. Choose the plaintext
module t that is co-prime with L + 1 chosen decreasing
ciphertext moduli qL  · · ·  q0 for each level and
set βl = blog qlc + 1. For each level l ∈ {L, . . . , 0},
uniformly sample an element Al←R2βlql . Finally, output
pp = (R,χ, {ql, Al}l∈{L,...,0}, t) as the public parameters
for the scheme.
- MKBGV.KeyGen(pp): To generate a key pair and the eval-
uation key for a user, perform the following steps.
- Randomly choose L small elements s′l←χ and define
sl = (1,−s′l)T ∈ R2ql . Output the secret key as the set
sk = {sl}l∈{L,...,0}.
- For each level l ∈ {L, . . . , 0}, sample small noise
el←χ2βl and define the pair (bl = Als′l + tel, Al) ∈
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R2βlql . Output the user’s public key as the set of tuples
pk = {(bl, Al)}l∈{L,...,0}.
- For each level l ∈ {L, . . . , 0}, generate the helper compo-
nent ek′l which is used later to generate the evaluation key
for the performing homomorphic evaluation on extended
ciphertexts. The component consists of two pairs of ring-
variant of GSW ciphertexts which encrypt each bit of
the user’s secret key s and encrypt the randomness used
in the encryption. For each bit i = 0, . . . , 2βl, sample
two random elements ri,l, r′i,l←χ and the error matrix
Ei,l = (ei,l,1, ei,l,2) ∈ χ2βl×2. Compute the ring-GSW
ciphertexts under the (l − 1)-th public key element:
Θi,l = ri,l(bl−1, Al−1) + tEi,l + Powersof2(sl)[i]G
Ψi,l = r
′
i,l(bl−1, Al−1) + tE
′
i,l + BitDecomp(sl)[i]G
and the corresponding BGV encryptions of randomness
Fi,l (and F ′i,l), which encrypts each bit of the ran-
dom element ri,l (and r′i,l). Finally, output the helper
component for the evaluation key generated as ek′l =
{(Θi,l, Fi,l), (Ψi,l, F ′i,l)}i∈{0,...,2βl},l∈{L,...,0}
- MKBGV.Enc(pk, µ): Given a message µ←Rt and a user’s
public key pk, perform the original BGV encryption function
starting at level L. Later, as the ciphertext is evaluated, the
level changes to a small l ∈ {L− 1, . . . , 0}
Sample error noises e, e′←χ and a random polynomial with
binary coefficients r←R2 and compute the ciphertext as
c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2qL where c0 = rbL + te + µ and c1 =
rAL + te
′. Moreover, suppose that S is an ordered set of
all indexes of the users in which a ciphertext is encrypted
under their secret keys.
Output the fresh BGV ciphertext as the tuple c = (c, S, L).
We denote [·] as a regular BGV ciphertext encrypted under
the public key pk. Note that the output is fresh encryption;
hence, it is starting at level L. However, this level changes
as the ciphertext is evaluated.
- MKBGV.Ext({pk1, . . . , pkN}, c): To extend a BGV cipher-
text at level l to one encrypted under a set of n users’ keys,
simply set the ciphertext C as a concatenated N sub-vectors
c¯ = (c′1| . . . |c′N ) ∈ R2nql , such that c′i = ci if the index i ∈ S,
and c′i = 0 otherwise. We denote [[·]] as an extended BGV
ciphertext encrypted under the set of keys {pk1, . . . , pkN}.
- MKBGV.EvalKeyGen({pk1, . . . , pkN}, {ek′1, . . . , ek′N}):
This function generates an evaluation key ekl for an
extended ciphertext c¯ = (C¯, S, l) encrypted under N
public keys of the users in S. Given the set of public keys
{pk1, . . . , pkN} and the corresponding helper components
{ek′1, . . . , ek′N}, generate the evaluation key as follows.
First, for each user i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, extend each GSW
encryption of the secret key si,l, that is encrypted under
the next level’s key si,l−1, to the other set of keys
{sj 6=i,l−1}j∈{1,...,N}. Then, using each encrypted bit of
s¯l, homomorphically compute s¯′l = s¯l ⊗ s¯l ∈ R4N
2
ql
. The
output of this operation are bit-wisely encrypted Kp,ζ
encrypted under the concatenated key corresponding to the
next level s¯l−1. Finally, output the extended evaluation key
as e¯kl = {Kp,}
- MKBGV.Eval(c¯, c¯′): Given two extended ciphertexts c¯, c¯′ ∈
R2Nql encrypted under the same concatenated keys s¯l,
perform homomorphic addition as element-wise addition
c¯add = c¯+ c¯
′( mod ql) or the homomorphic multiplication
as the tensor product c¯mult = c¯⊗ c¯′( mod ql). After the ho-
momorphic evaluation, perform KeySwitch technique using
the generated evaluation key e¯kl to generate a ciphertext
under the next level’s key s¯l−1, and the ModulusSwitch
technique to reduce the resultant noise by switching to a
smaller ciphertext modulus ql−1.
- MKBGV.Dec({sk1, . . . , skN}, c¯): Given an extended cipher-
text c¯ encrypted at level l under the set S of users’ keys, and
the secret key s¯l = {s1,l| . . . |sN,l} that is the concatenation
of all the users’ secret keys in the set, decryption is as
〈c¯, s¯l〉 =
∑N
i=1〈c′i, si,l〉 = te + µ = µ mod t. The
decryption is correct since each secret key si,l decrypts the
corresponding sub-vector ciphertext c′i.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. System setting
We describe our approach with a working example of
collaborative evaluation of random forest for classification
tasks. In the collaborative setting, as shown in Fig. 1, a
semi-honest cloud “evaluator” classifies a client based on the
encrypted decision trees from the N model owners. More
formally, each model owner Mi; i ∈ {1, . . . , N} encrypts their
decision tree Ti that consists of a set of decision nodes and
leaf nodes under their respective keys. At each decision node,
a boolean function is securely evaluated using an encrypted
threshold y and a client’s encrypted input x. The output is
an encrypted bit b, which is used to perform a conditional
branching to traverse to the leaf node that contains a class
label. At the end of the decision tree evaluation, the evaluator
performs a secure counting protocol to calculate the frequency
of each unique class label. Note, we focus on random forest
evaluation for clarity, but the proposed approach is applicable
to other ML techniques, such as deep learning because it
requires matrix operations on data encrypted under different
keys.
Boolean function within each decision node is the funda-
mental unit within a decision tree. For clarity, we focus our
description on evaluating a Boolean function and a conditional
branching program in one of the decision nodes. Similar
evaluation procedures follow for the rest of the decision nodes.
Suppose this decision node has two leaf nodes with two
distinct class labels A,B ∈ {0, 1}. Let a client C holds an input
bit x ∈ {0, 1} encrypted under his key pkC . Suppose each
model owner Mi holds an one node decision tree represented
as the polynomial Ti = bi · A + (1 − bi) · B and a threshold
yi ∈ {0, 1} encrypted under a joint key pkM. Assume this
decision node contains a Boolean function bi = 1(x 6= yi) =
x + yi (mod 2), the output bit bi is then used to evaluate
the branching program for Ti and output a class label A or
B. Note, the output of Ti is A if x and yi differ, otherwise
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it outputs B. Let the random forest F = {T1, . . . , TN} be
the collection of random forest outputs. The final output of F
depends on the frequency of each unique class label.
B. Current solutions
In the collaborative setting in Fig. 1, one can use a thresh-
old HE scheme to support computation with different keys.
Mainly, participants (i.e., model owners Mi and client Ci )
generate among them a joint key from their individual keys to
encrypt their inputs and compute under this joint key. Let P
be the number of clients registered in the system. Before the
computation, the set of N model owners must have a key setup
with each of their clients Ci to generate a joint key pkM,Ci .
This means the model owners generate in advance P different
joint keys {pkM,C∞ , . . . , pkM,CP}. This approach also means
that each model owner must prepare P encrypted copies of
their models to the cloud, one for each distinct joint key.
As an alternative, participants can encrypt their inputs
under their individual keys, but extend them to additional
keys using the MKHE scheme at evaluation. This way, the
model owners delegate one encryption copy of their models
to the cloud. When a client Ci requests an evaluation, each
SWHE ciphertext c = (c0, c1) is extended to one in the form
c¯ = {cM1 | . . . |cMN |cCi} ∈ R2(N+1)q under the set of N + 1
keys {pkM1 , . . . , pkMN , pkCi}, resulting in linear expansion of
the ciphertext size.
Our proposed approach leverages both the threshold and
multi-key HE techniques. There is no need to set up a joint
key for each client with the model owners, and ciphertexts are
extended only under two different keys instead of N + 1 keys
resulting in a reduction in the ciphertext size.
C. Our new approach
Our new approach consists of four different phases: key
setup, encryption, evaluation, and decryption. Figures 2 and 3
give an illustration and overview of these four phases.
1) Key setup: In this phase, we generate key pair
(pkMi , skMi) for each model owner, and key pair (pkCi , skCi)
for each client. Moreover, we generate the corresponding
evaluation helper elements ek′Mi and ek
′
Ci , which encrypts
auxiliary information about the secret key. These elements are
used to produce the evaluation key ek, which is required to
perform key switching after each homomorphic evaluation in
the multi-key BGV scheme.
a) Model owners: In this system setting, the N model
owners do not change frequently; hence, we set up a joint key
pkM once before the start of the protocol as shown in Fig. 2(a).
The joint key is generated, in a threshold manner, as the sum of
the model owners’ individual keys pkM =
∑N
i=1 = pkMi . It is
used to encrypt the models before sending them to the cloud.
Note that the encrypted model cannot be decrypted unless all
the model owners collaborated since the corresponding secret
key skM is shared among them. The joint key can be revoked
or updated, but this requires running the threshold key setup
again and encrypting the models with the new joint key.
This threshold key setup differs from the one proposed
by Asharov et al. [9] because, at the end of their protocol,
the evaluation key ek that is used in evaluation is directly
generated. However, in our approach, we need first to generate
the evaluation helper element ek′ that can be extended later in
the MKHE scheme described in Sec II-E.
As mentioned, ek′ must encrypt information on the bits
of the secret key sM. The secret key sM is shared among
N parties; therefore, we can generate the evaluation helper
element by homomorphically adding the individual ek′Mi . The
homomorphic addition can be achieved by using performing a
fast full adder on the encrypted bits. The full adder algorithm
contains a homomorphic multiplication, which is not the most
efficient design. We briefly discuss optimization in Sec. IV.
b) Clients: Each client C independently generates their
own key pair (skC , pkC). The output of the key generation step
also includes a generated evaluation helper element ek′C .
2) Encryption: The model owner Mi encrypts each thresh-
old value yi and the class labels A,B under the joint key
pkM. The model owner sends the encryptions and the evalu-
ation helper element (pkM, ek
′
M, [yi]M, [A]M, [B]M) to the
evaluator. The evaluator then encrypts, under the joint public
key pkM, the value 1 which is a part of the model Ti.
On the other hand, the client encrypts the input bit x ∈
{0, 1} under their public key pkC and sends the encryption
[x]C ∈ R2q to the evaluator for evaluation.
When the client C requests an evaluation, the evaluator
first extends each ciphertext under the set of the two keys
p¯k = {pkM, pkC} as described in the extending algorithm
Ext({pkM, pkC}, c) in Sec. II-E. The extended client’s cipher-
text is [[x]] = {[x]C , 0} ∈ R4q . Other ciphertexts are extended
similarly to obtain [[y]] = {0, [yi]M}, [[A]] = {0, [A]M}, and
[[B]] = {0, [B]M}.
3) Evaluation: For each model Ti in the joint model
F = {T1, . . . , TN}, compute the encrypted boolean value
[[bi]] as the sum of the two extended ciphertexts [[x]], [[yi]],
such that [[bi]] = [[x]] + [[yi]] = {[x]C , 0} + {0, [yi]M} =
{[x]C , [yi]M} ∈ R4q .
After that, the obtained boolean value is used to evaluate
the model Ti(x) = [[vi]] = [[bi]] · [[A]] + ([[1]] − [[b]]) · [[B]],
such that [[vi]] = {[x]C , [y]M} · {0, [A]M} + ({0, [1]M}−
{[x]C , [y]M}) · {0, [B]M}.
The homomorphic multiplication of two extended cipher-
texts c¯, c¯′ ∈ R4q is performed as a tensor product c¯ ⊗ c¯′ ∈
R16q , which increases the dimension exponentially. The key
switching technique is then applied with the help of the
evaluation key ek to reduce the dimension, such that c¯mult =
KeySwitch(ek, c¯⊗c¯′) ∈ R4q , and perform further homomorphic
operations.
After evaluating each model {T1(x), . . . , TN (x), the results
are aggregated using a secure count protocol (its implemen-
tation is omitted due to space limitations). The output of the
protocol is the encryption of the class label with the highest
count.
4) Decryption: After the evaluation, the evaluator pro-
duces the result that is encrypted under the extended key
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the four main phases for secure collaborative evaluation protocol with multi-key support.
p¯k = {pkM, pkC}. To decrypt the extended ciphertext result
c¯ = {cC , cM}, we need the corresponding extended secret key
s¯ = {sC , sM}. Note that the secret key sM is secretly shared
among N model owners, hence we propose the following de-
cryption algorithm, Dec(c¯, s¯) = 〈cC , sC〉+
∑N
i=1〈cM, sMi〉 =
(µ′C + teC) + (µ
′
M + teM) = µ¯+ te¯ ≈ µ mod t.
In the collaborative system design, the client will not be
able to decrypt the result without model owners’ secret shares
of the key. Hence, the evaluator invokes a decryption protocol
to obtain a decryption component needed to perform the part∑N
i=1〈cM, sMi〉 from the decryption algorithm shown above.
In our protocol, the evaluator performs a partial decryption
on the result such that it transforms it to a ciphertext under
the client’s key. As shown in Fig. 2(c), the evaluator sends
cM,1 to all model owners. Upon receiving cM,1, each model
owner Mi will construct ρi = cM,1sMi + teMi , where eMi
is a large smudging noise, and return it back to the evaluator.
After collecting the components from all model owners, the
evaluator send the extended encrypted result c¯ to the client
along with the aggregated value ρ =
∑N
i=1 ρi = cM,1sM +
teM. The client then computes:
µ′ = 〈cC , sC〉+ (cM,0 − ρ)
= (cC,0 − cC,1sc) + (cM,0 − cM,1sM + teM)
= µ′C + teC + µ
′
M + teM
= µ¯+ te¯
≈ µ mod t
IV. SECURITY AND COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
A. Security analysis
Our proposed approach is secure in the semi-honest setting,
where the system users follow the protocol specification and
do not deviate from it. The semi-honest cloud evaluates on
encrypted models and client inputs, which are protected under
the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme.
The decryption protocol follows the dishonest-majority as-
sumption where all the users are required to participate in
decryption to retrieve the final classification result. Note that
the cloud invokes a threshold decryption protocol to generate
a decryption component from the model owners. This step
generates the decryption component for the partial ciphertext
cM encrypted under pkM, but the result remains encrypted
under the client’s key, who performs the final decryption.
B. Complexity analysis
We analyze the space and communication complexities of
the proposed approach. The size of the extended ciphertext
expands at most two concatenated ciphertext, i.e., a constant
of size 2. For communication, the one-time threshold key setup
requires at most N interactions between model owners. The
collaborative evaluation of the models based on the client’s in-
put requires two interactions. The decryption protocol requires
2N interactions with the model owners.
C. Optimizations
The threshold key setup in our approach is performed in
an MPC setting. While the design is secure, it is not efficient
due to the full adder circuit that consists of homomorphic
multiplication. Alternatively as an optimization, we can make
a small security trade-off by using a trusted party. The trusted
party generates a key pair (pkM, skM), and the evaluation
helper element ek′ directly from the secret key skM = sM.
To produce the secret shares of the secret key for each model
owner {M1, . . . ,MN}, we sample N small secrets such that
skMi = (sM −
∑N
j=1 sMj ); i 6= j.
V. RELATED WORK
A common way to support multiple keys is to leverage
the additive homomorphism of the key space. This property
enables the establishment of a joint key from individual keys
owned by individual users without the need for a trusted party.
By direct aggregation of the users’ public keys, we can effort-
lessly set up a (n, n) threshold encryption scheme. Desmedt
and Frankel [15] proposed a threshold version of ElGamal
scheme [16] based on Shamir’s secret sharing. Specifically,
assume we have set of n users where each with user i has an
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Setup phase.
Model owner Mi ∈M: (1) Generate SWHE key pairs (pkMi , skMi) and evaluation helper element ek′Mi
(2) Generate with the other model owners the joint key pkM =
∑N
i=1 pkMi and the evaluation helper element ek
′
M =
∑N
i=1 ek
′
Mi
.
(3) Provide a threshold bit y ∈ R2 and two possible output bits A,B ∈ R2.
(4) Define a model as the polynomial Ti = bi ·A+ (1− bi) ·B, such that bi = 1(x 6= yi).
Client C: (1) Provide an input bit x ∈ R2.
(2) Generate SWHE key pairs (pkC , skC)) and the evaluation helper element ek
′
C
Encryption phase.
Model owner Mi: (1) Encrypt the threshold and class labels bits yi, A,B using the joint public key pkM, and output [yi]M, [A]M, [B]M.
(3) Send (pkM, ek
′
M, [yi]M, [A]M, [B]M) to the evaluator.
Client C: (1) Encrypt the bit x using the SWHE public key pkC , and output [x].
(3) Send (pkC , ek
′
C , [x]) to the evaluator to start the evaluation.
Evaluator: (1) Encrypt the value 1 under the model owner’s key pkM, and output [1]M. (2) Extend the ciphertexts [y]M, [A]M, [B]M, [1]M
from encryptions under pkM to ones under the extended SWHE key p¯k = {pkM, pkc} using the extension function MKBGV.Ext,
and output [[y]] = {0, [y]M}, [[A]] = {0, [A]M}, [[B]] = {0, [B]M}, [[1]] = {0, [1]M}.
(2) Similarly, Extend ciphertexts [x]C from encryption under pkC , yielding [[x]] = {[x]C, 0}.
Evaluation phase.
Evaluator: (1) Evaluate [[b]] = MKBGV.EvalAdd([[x]], [[y]]); the result is [[b]] = [[1]](x 6= y).
(2) Evaluate each decision tree Ti using [[b]], and output [[vi]] = Ti(x, yi).
(3) Perform secure counting protocol among results, yielding F(x) = [[vk]] where zk is maximum.
(4) Send the second ciphertext [c]M of the encrypted result F(x) to each model owner Mi to help with decryption.
Decryption phase.
Model owner Mi: (1) Construct ρi = c1sMi from each ciphertext [c]M = (c0, c1) using their secret share sMi .
(2) Add a large “smudging” error tei to the component, such that ρi = c1sMi + tei.
(3) Send this new component ρi back to the evaluator.
Evaluator: (1) Compute ρ =
∑N
i=1 ρi =
∑N
i=1(c1sMi + tei).
(2) Send the encrypted result F(x) with the aggregated decryption component ρ to the client.
Client C: (1) Decrypt the ciphertext F(X) that is encrypted under the extended key p¯k = {pkC , pkM} using the provided component ρ
and the client’s own secret key skC to obtain the final result.
Fig. 3: An overview of secure decision tree evaluation phases using the proposed approach for multi-key support.
independently generated key pair (pki = g
si , ski = si). Then,
the joint key is computed as pk∗ =
∏n
i=1 pki = pk
∑n
i=1 si .
A user can encrypt the data under the generated joint public
key and compute using the homomorphic properties of the
scheme. However, the decryption of the ciphertexts has to be
performed by all n users. Asharov et al. [9] proposed another
threshold scheme extended from the BGV scheme [3]. Detail
of this scheme was described in Section II.
A more dynamic approach to support multiparty computa-
tion with multiple keys is multi-key HE. Lopez-Alt et al [12]
introduced the first notion of MKHE schemes to support
the homomorphic evaluation on ciphertexts encrypted under
different keys. Its construction was based on NTRU. Many
works [17], [18], [19], [20], [21] followed after proposing
constructions with different capabilities and security assump-
tions. Similar to threshold HE schemes, distributed decryption
is required where the users collaborate to decrypt.
The first multi-key HE scheme that is based on the LWE
problem was proposed by Clear and McGoldrick [17]. It
was then simplified by Mukherjee and Wichs [18] who also
built a general two-round MPC protocol on top of it. The
basic scheme is constructed based on the GSW scheme [6]
and extended to support multiple keys. For an unbounded
number of users, they can homomorphically compute on their
individually encrypted inputs and output a ciphertext result
encrypted under multiple keys. The scheme is described as
single-hop, which means that the ciphertext result cannot
be extended to additional keys after being homomorphically
evaluated. The decryption of the result can be retrieved by
combining partial decryptions which were performed by each
party.
A more advanced MKHE enables multi-hop key extension,
which intuitively means that a homomorphically evaluated
ciphertext can be further extended to additional keys. Peikert
and Shiehian [20] proposed two (leveled) MKHE schemes
basing their security on the standard LWE and its circular
security assumptions. The core difference between the two
schemes is the extension function which results in largely
expanded ciphertexts in the first scheme, and small original
GSW ciphertexts with large expanded public keys in the
second scheme. A ciphertext can be expanded to one that is
encrypted under a set of users’ concatenated keys. The size
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of the ciphertext increases quadratically with the number of
users. They also proposed an alternative scheme, in which it
yields small keys and large ciphertexts. More technically, the
key pair is just GSW key, and helper information matrices are
embedded in the ciphertexts instead of public keys. However,
this design is less practical than their main proposed scheme
since it is more likely that the number of homomorphic
operations on the ciphertext exceeds the number of extended
keys.
Brakerski and Perlman [19] proposed a fully MKHE scheme
based on the GSW scheme which realized extended ciphertexts
that grows linearly with the size of included keys. The scheme
applies on-the-fly bootstrapping technique to enable unlimited
multiple evaluations on extended ciphertexts. Chen et al. [13]
proposed the first MKHE scheme that is based on RLWE. They
extend the BGV scheme [3] to a multi-hop MKHE where the
ciphertext size also grows linearly with the number of the
bounded number of keys. The evaluation keys are generated
as ring-GSW ciphertexts such that they can be extended to
multiple keys which correspond to the expanded ciphertext.
Advancements have been proposed in the literature to ex-
tend homomorphic ciphertexts to multiple users’ keys. The
ciphertexts can be decrypted using the concatenated secret
keys associated with public keys. Releasing secret keys to
other parties presents security issues since a released secret
key can be used to decrypt the user’s other ciphertexts. The
more secure approach used in proposed MKHE schemes is
to hold a secure MPC decryption protocol where each of
the involved users locally performs partial decryption of the
ciphertext using his secret key. Yasuda et al., [22] proposed
an alternative approach which applies Proxy Re-Encryption
technique (PRE) to allow an extended ciphertext to be re-
encrypted under the receiver’s key such that it becomes
decryptable by its secret key. Their work extends the Peikert-
Shiehian MKHE scheme [20] to include two more functions,
one for generating a re-encryption key, and the other is for
performing the ciphertext re-encryption.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new approach that combines the threshold
and multi-key HE to support collaborative computation on
ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. In the collaborative
machine learning setting, our proposed approach (i) removes
the need of key setup between a client and the set of model
owners, (ii) reduces the number of encryption of the same
model, and (iii) reduces the ciphertext size with dimension
reduction from (N + 1) × 2 to 2 × 2. We presented the
detail design of this approach and analyzed the complexity
and security.
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